The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning by Carter, Stephen L.
THE RIGHT QUESTIONS IN THE CREATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGt
STEPHEN L. CARTER*
In the peculiar rhetoric that is rapidly growing ubiquitous, constitutional
theorists and anti-theorists seem to thrive on accusing one another of asking
and answering the wrong questions.' Apparently only a limited number of
items are permitted on the theoretical agenda, and those who search beyond
its limits must be quickly, even angrily, struck aside. Those denounced for
the shape of their agendas may be condemned as nihilists or normal scien-
tists, as extremist or irrelevant, as unsophisticated or incoherent. Indeed,
critical analysis without an accompanying denunciation is an art form that
barely has a place any longer in legal scholarship. In the realm of constitu-
tional theory the problem is particularly acute, and perhaps made worse
because so much is now being written in a field that not so long ago was near
to being written off.
Ronald Dworkin may be right to suggest that far too much talent is
squandered on efforts to legitimate some "objective" form of judicial re-
view. 2 I have no idea. I have never tried to do it-not, at least, through
sketching some grand theory to explain and justify the general trends in the
work of our constitutional courts. If Erwin Chemerinsky believes that I
have,3 then I fear that I have not written as clearly as the subject matter
demands. For in his "reply" to my recent modest foray into the muddy and
treacherous thicket of constitutional theory, he concludes that I have failed
"because all who try to develop a value free system of judicial review
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To trace but one odyssey, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102
(1962) ("[T]o seek in historical materials relevant to the framing of the Constitution,
or in the language of the Constitution itself, specific answers to specific present
problems is to ask the wrong questions .... "); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
72 (1980) (criticizing Bickel) ("No answer is what the wrong question begets."); and
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
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2 See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981) (criticizing
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inevitably must fail." 4 Maybe they must. Were I among them, I would no
doubt consider solving the problem to be the definitive mission of my
intellectual enterprise. But I'm not and I don't.
My mission in Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle -- the essay with which Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky so earnestly disagrees-was quite different from and
significantly more modest than the one he attributes to me. My concern was
not with the justification for judicial review, but rather with the literature
seeking to defend it against what I called the "delegitimizing" assault, the
attack contending that judicial review as practiced in the United States is
inconsistent with the liberal democratic theory on which the nation's politics
are premised. I did not argue that the delegitimizers are wrong-I don't have
the background in fashionable European literary theory to do that-but I did
contend that those who defend against the assault by trying to create grand
theories are likely to fail. 6 On this proposition, Professor Chemerinsky and I
apparently agree.
We do not agree, however, on my further ambition. I had thought that I
made it clear on the third page of my essay: "I am not so bold as to claim that
my approach resolves the problem raised by the delegitimizing critique of
conventional constitutional theory, but the approach does, I think, suggest
some avenues that conventional theorists who desire to repulse the assault
ought to travel." ' 7 My own conception of the essay was that I did no more
than set out a research project. But judging from Professor Chemerinsky's
response, as well as some of the very interesting correspondence that I have
received, perhaps I set it out poorly. So rather than spend time and space
playing quote-for-quote with my essay and Professor Chemerinsky's re-
sponse, I will try in a somewhat different fashion to say what I thought I was
saying the first time.
I. OUR POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
My thesis, a bit over-simplified, is this: The effort to meld extra-constitu-
tional review with liberal democratic theory has so far failed, primarily
because it concedes the major premise of the delegitimizing argument. The
premise is that judicial review is inherently counter-majoritarian and, as
such, is in sore need of a logical justification. I dispute the premise. I am
unconvinced that what might be termed effective judicial review-the pro-
duction of judicial decisions that work important changes in society-is
necessarily counter-majoritarian, and I doubt whether efforts to justify it in
terms assuming that it is can possibly succeed. I am quite skeptical of efforts
4 Id. at 69.
1 Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985}.
11 Id. at 831-40.
7 Id. at 823.
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to justify the modem Supreme Court's search for fundamental rights by
"proving" that some set of rights "really is" constitutionally protected. I am
equally unconvinced by the arguments aimed at "proving" that the same set
of rights "really isn't." In fact, I doubt whether the fundamental rights
jurisprudence is even a useful place to search for the "proof" that conven-
tional theorists seem to require of each other.
Thus in my Indeterminate Text essay, I proposed that liberal scholars
seeking to repulse the delegitimizing assault (and to preserve their favorite
fundamental rights decisions) should leave grand theories for a time and
undertake a different task: To try to preserve the checks and balances
inherent in the structure of what I call the "political Constitution." This they
should do in part by propounding interpretive rules that will narrow judicial
ability to work changes in that structure, and in part through a critical
analysis of doctrines the courts now apply when facing constitutional ques-
tions concerning the structure of government.
The political Constitution comprises those provisions of the Constitution
that establish the structure of the government of the United States. 8 These
provisions are quite frequently more concrete than the open-ended clauses
protecting individual rights. 9 I noted in my original essay that whereas the
individual rights clauses tend to be worded so broadly that a substantial act
of faith is required to explain why their construction should be tied to some
specific set of views at some specific time, the structural clauses are gener-
ally phrased as though they have more specific referents. 10 1 certainly did not
mean to suggest what Professor Chemerinsky quite properly refutes, that the
structural clauses are always more concrete than individual rights provisions
or that they are necessarily self-executing; I did not insist that they are
always clear at all. I did assert, however, that they are often relatively clear,
that reasonable and workable interpretations of many of them have been
developed in our governmental praxis without resort to judicial review, and
that as a consequence-and also for other reasons that I shall explain-the
courts, when judicial review is necessary, ought to select interpretive rules
that limit their ability to upset the working balance of powers.II
The clauses constituting the government of the United States are part of a
concrete plan of checks and balances and the sharing of power. This struc-
ture is designed, in Justice Jackson's phrase, to "integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government." 12 Although judges and scholars some-
times forget the fact, the courts take their authority from and act within that
8 Id. at 853-55.
9 Id. at 854. But see Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitu-
tional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985) (arguing that at best only a handful of
insignificant structural clauses may be considered determinate).
10 Carter, supra.note 5, at 853-54.
1 Id. at 855-59
12 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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integrated structure even as they interpret it, and therefore ought to be
self-consciously reserved about the tension between their dual roles as
player and referee. I3 Thus when I propose the selection of rules of construc-
tion that narrow the ability of the judges to read what they please into the
structural provisions, I do so not because the need to narrow judicial discre-
tion is a God-given concomitant of the constitutional process, but rather
because a judge who is adjudicating a case arising under the political Con-
stitution is construing the rules that govern the system of checks and bal-
ances. It is this system, dynamic and complete, that makes judicial review
possible. A judge whose discretion is unfettered in construing the rules of the
game is in essence acting as referee while out on the playing field. It is this
discretion-the, freedom for each judge to read what she pleases into the
structural clauses-that a theory aimed at protecting the judicial function
must curtail. I am not calling for some wholly "objective" standard, 14 and I
would not deny the creative aspect of the interpretation of these clauses; I
would simply choose rules that channel this creativity.
This choice does not rest on an assumption that the clauses of the political
Constitution are somehow already determinate, that the meaning of every
provision is perfectly plain. The choice of narrowing interpretive rules rests
instead on the function of the structural clauses. These clauses are constitu-
tive in a literal sense: They tell us how the federal government was designed
to operate. That the design is not always crystal clear does not mean that
there is no design. Thus the same choice of interpretive rules tending to
narrow judicial discretion should be applied in construing those structural
clauses that are less determinate than others.
The project, in this sense, is not to take what is already determinate and
render it more so, for I do not mean to claim that every clause that is within
the political Constitution is more determinate than every clause that is not;
the project instead is to render the whole of the political Constitution as
determinate as possible. If this can be done, then I believe that mainstream
legal scholars will have taken a very long step toward refuting the contention
that judicial review is a garish and loosely hanging thread within the fabric of
liberalism. If the work of the courts can be shown to be part of a dynamic
and functioning system of checks and balances, then the debate suddenly
involves something quite different than before.
13 See Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presi-
dential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1368 (1983). Professor
Chemerinsky contends that "the very existence of judicial review cannot be justified
from an originalist perspective." Id. at 57. The better evidence, however, is to the
contrary. See e.g., R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); C. Black,
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
14 At best, objectivity describes a means of constraint, not something that is
inherently and obviously valuable in itself. See Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional
Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984); cf. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the
Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 169 (1968) (a preliminary analysis of the political nature of Supreme Court
decisionmaking).
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Choosing rules of interpretation that help render the system of checks and
balances determinate is vital to the success of this project. The system was
designed with a particular vision of government operation in mind. If the
goal is restricting the freedom of the judge to alter the rules that bestow her
authority, and if one believes that those who wrote and ratified the Constitu-
tion shared a consensus, an original understanding on the operation of the
system of checks and balances of which judicial review forms so vital a part,
then a rule requiring consideration of that understanding is a sensible one to
choose. I I
But even this much seems to cause trouble. The word "originalism"
nowadays has understandably become a red flag to many theorists, carrying
as it does lurid images of reaction and retrenchment run rampant. If my
modest proposal seems to march behind the banner fully unfurled, then
perhaps I have failed to explain with adequate care what I have in mind. My
claim is not that originalism is value-free, at least not in the sense in which
Professor Chemerinsky uses the term when he states: "The decision to
implement the Framers' values is a normative choice."' 6 Of course the
choice is normative, which is why I sought to make clear that when I refer to
rules of construction that are relatively value-free (I do not omit the qualifier
as he does), I am speaking of rules demanding the fewest value choices from
the interpreter in the process of their application. 17 It is the application of the
interpretive rule to the relevant text-not the selection of the rule itself-that
should be as neutral as possible. ' That selecting an interpretive rule calling
for any degree of originalism requires a value choice is quite plain to me,
although this by itself is not an argument against originalism, since the
selection of every other interpretive rule also requires a value choice. The
responsibility of a theorist is to articulate the value involved, to state the
reasons behind the choice of a particular interpretive rule. I had thought that
my essay set forth the values that led me to select a moderately originalist
11 I do not mean to assert, however, that a rule calling for consideration of an
original understanding is the best rule or the only rule that can be applied to the task I
set out. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
16 Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 63.
17 Carter, supra note 5, at 861-65. Obviously, I misspoke when I wrote that courts
should strive "to avoid value-laden rules of interpretation" when adjudicating cases
arising under the political Constitution. Id. at 862. It is not the rules but the process
of application that must be as free of ad hoc value judgments as the interpreters can
make it, and the rules that I propose would "render considerably more difficult the
task of masking value choices behind legal generalizations." Id.; see also
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
982 (1978).
"8 The distinction is crucial. The mere fact that a value choice is necessarily
involved in the selection of a rule does not mean either that an interpreter cannot
strive to avoid a similar value choice in its application or that she cannot select a rule
limiting the opportunity for that second, often surreptitious value choice. See Fiss,
-Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985).
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rule in the narrow sphere within which I consider that strategy a sensible
one.' 9
Professor Chemerinsky ridicules this strategy. "It is circular," he writes,
"to argue that because the Framers intended that we follow their intent, we
are obligated to follow it.' 20 I quite agree, which is why I noted in my essay
that "I do not rest my argument concerning the weight to be given the
Framers' views on the weight they intended their views to have."' z I think
that Phillip Bobbit had the point exactly right when he pointed out that,
absent an independent argument for following their will, holding that we
must enforce the author's view of the scope of a constitutional clause
because the author wrote it makes no more sense than holding that we must
enforce the view Democritus had of an atom simply because he coined the
word. 22 Consequently, the interpretive visions of the document's authors
are relatively unimportant to my scheme.2 3 I propose the approach that I do
for reasons quite apart from any interpretive tautology.
For me the selection of interpretive rules reflects a value judgment, and
quite an important one: I am seeking a strategy to confine the judicial ability
to create what I have called "fresh checks"-checks not a part of the
constitutional scheme of balanced and separated powers.24 My goal, as I
explained in the original essay, is to construct a constitutional safe harbor, a
place where adjudication will be possible through an ordered application of
interpretive rules to a text and its history.2 5 The political Constitution strikes
me as the obvious place to build, at least if we want an edifice that will stand.
Were the courts somehow above the political fray rather than an integral part
of it, finding narrowing hermeneutical methods would perhaps be less impor-
tant. But if the work of the judiciary is, as I have suggested, a vital part of the
system of checks and balances, then rendering that system as concrete as
can be is plainly indispensable.
"9 See Carter, supra note 5, at 859-65.
20 Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 59; see also Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42
OHIO Sr. L.J. 187, 193 n.22 (1981).
21 Carter, supra note 5, at 858 n. 139. Indeed, faced with Jefferson Powell's work in
this area, only a very bold or very foolish theorist would dare assert that those who
wrote and ratified the Constitution wanted to bind later generations to their narrow
conception of the scope of their document. See Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
22 See P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9 (1982).
23 1 say "relatively" unimportant because I do care about whether the language of
the text seems designed to invite the importation of external considerations in its
interpretation, or whether the words reflect a narrower conception. I do not consider
the interpreter wholly bound by this design, but I also do not see how an interpreter
can ignore it altogether. See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 488-98.
24 See Carter, supra note 5, at 862-65; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
25 Carter, supra note 5, at 864-65.
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I do not necessarily propose the selection of the same interpretive rules
when the proper construction of one of the open-ended individual rights
clauses is at issue. I am quite convinced that bounded interpretation is
important under these clauses too, but the bounds can be drawn quite
differently. The scope of allowable discretion can be left broader, if the
review itself takes place as part of a functioning and integrated system of
checks and balances. By explaining the significance of this system, I hoped
to tilt some part of the scholarly enterprise toward its explication.
That much and no more was my goal. I admit that the Indeterminate Text
essay took a controversial route to get there, and I should take a few
paragraphs to say why I chose it. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, I first
spent a few pages doing what probably too many articles in this genre
do-picking apart the efforts thus far to defend the liberal conception of
judicial review. 26 1 then tried to explain what I perceive to be the limited
counter-majoritarian significance of the fundamental rights decisions, which
remain central to the debate. 27 When I say that the counter-majoritarian
significance is limited, I do not mean to suggest that there is none. My point
is that the governing role of courts is partly illusory. Over the very shortest
term-the span of a single decision constraining the parties to it-any judi-
cial decision might be termed effective and in a sense counter-majoritarian.
Perhaps even this rather mild binding effect might be contrary to liberal
democratic theory if not properly justified, 28 but direct obedience by the
parties involved seems quite a weak test of runaway governance. The right
test for effectiveness of judicial action, for the authoritativeness of judicial
pronouncements, and for the anti-democratic effect of any decision, is surely
not the last case but the next one.
Even when the most self-consciously interventionist judge hands down an
opinion intended to decree a revolution, that decision stands little prospect
of lasting significance unless joined to a movement through which the people
change their own world. In the end it is societal transformation that solidifies
what the court might begin. If the society transforms itself in response to
judicial reprimand, as it began to do in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education, 2 9 that does not strike me as a co'unter-majoritarian result. If the
society refuses to transform itself, as it did in battling and beating Lochner v.
New York 30 and its progeny, and the Court retreats, that does not strike me
as a counter-authoritarian result. 31 Sometimes the courts succeed in chang-
26 Id. at 831-47.
27 See id. at 849-52.
28 Cf. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 383, 390 (1985)
("[I]t may take decades to accomplish the reversal of a single decision.").
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3' The counter-authoritarian difficulty that occurs when the Constitution is not
enforced receives considerably less attention from contemporary scholars than the
counter-majoritarian difficulty said to occur when it is. Cf. Gunther, The Subtle Vices
1986]
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ing the face of our society. Sometimes they fail. The distinction rests impor-
tantly on popular unwillingness to indulge the transformation-a quintessen-
fially democratic form of resistance. I hesitate to conclude that the argument
over the justification for this purportedly counter-majoritarian difficulty is a
waste of time, but I do suspect that there is less to it than there may seem.
The Justices and their constituents pay attention to each other, and that
strikes me as a result both pro-majoritarian and pro-authoritaian.
One criticism of such dialogic arguments as this one notes that if the
judges read the text of popular opinion and use that text to inform their
decisions-and in particular, to learn when to retreat-then while the courts
may be playing a role in governance, they are not enforcing the discoverable
law.3 2 But this criticism has less force than may appear. While the dialogic
conception is partly descriptive, I would add a normative gloss as well:
Whether sensitive to the response to theirjudgments or not, the judges ought
be self-conscious about the process through which- they render their deci-
sions. Judges, to the extent they are able, should try to set out in their
opinions the arguments that really swayed them, and to explain the interpre-
tive rules they have applied to reach their results. In other words, the judges
should try to enforce a discoverable law.
This element of striving can play a vital role in adjudication. A judge who
is honest will set out as clearly as she can the interpretive rules she has
applied in assigning meaning to a given text; she will try to explain what has
grounded her exercise of creative imagination. This self-referencing will
necessarily be incomplete, but the judicial task is to strive-not to win. A
judge who is self-conscious about her choice and application of rules should
more readily be convinced by strong arguments that her interpretive choices
or analytical technique are poor.33 That she may sometimes retreat-playing
of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (disputing the view that Justices should seek
devices for avoiding decisions).
32 Cf. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 752 (1982):
Neither the objectivity nor the correctness of Brown v. Board of Education
depends on the unanimity of the justices, and much less on the willingness of the
people-all the people, or most of the people-then or even now-to agree with
that decision. The test is whether that decision is in accord with the authoritative
disciplining rules. Short of a disagreement that denies the authority of the
interpretive community and the force of the disciplining rules, agreement is
irrelevant in determining whether a judge's decision is a proper interpretation of
the law.
33 A judge who is self-conscious in the sense that I use the term is one who while
aware of her prejudices tries to fight them, so that in her mind, at least, she is making
her decision as best she can by applying the rules that she has chosen to the text she
is called upon to explicate. Her written justification for her decision should set forth
both rule and text along with the analysis so that a reader can understand her
argument and more effectively critique it. Cf. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.-1, 13-14 (1979). Perhaps
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her dialogic role-does not mean she is not trying to enforce the law as she
understands it.
The other side of the critical coin is the claim that the dialogic conception
of judicial review, despite surface allure, is at bottom undemocratic. Thus
Judge Bork in a recent article has ridiculed dialogic arguments of this sort
with the assertion (presumably satirizing Keynes) that "[tihe theory as-
sumes ... that in the long run none of us will be dead." 34 What he means, I
suppose, is this: If wriggling out from under an illegitimate judicial decision
takes more than a lifetime, then someone is bound by it forever, and that
cannot be the meaning of our democracy. The criticism packs a hefty
rhetorical punch, but it necessarily rests on at least one of two worrisome
assumptions: First, that the courts are undemocratic whenever they are
wrong, and second, that bad results are undemocratic if they bind anyone for
a lifetime. The first assumption invites a revolution if ever a judge makes an
error; but if instead a larger pattern of abuse is needed before the courts are
acting undemocratically, then the long run is a perfectly sensible time to
wait. The second assumption would destroy, among other things, the jury
system, as there are rare cases in which the innocent are made to suffer
unjustly; but if single cases are not the test, then, again, we can wait out the
long run to deliver our verdict on the work of the courts.
Democracy and the Constitution, then, might exist more comfortably than
conventional theorists and their critics suppose. At the very least, there
seems to be rich ground here for study, and study is all that my original essay
proposed. 35 I do not insist that the research I propose will conclude that my
theory is right. On the contrary, it may .be that my description of the
fundamental rights cases is deeply flawed; it may be that my normative
prescription is a poor one; it may be that the structure of the Constitution
retards the development of the dialogue needed to make the theory work. All
of this remains to be learned. 36
These themes, I thought, were clear enough in my original essay, but it
may be that I was mistaken. Professor Chemerinsky, like some of those who
have corresponded with me, has apparently misapprehended the nature of
my research project, and so I should take pains to clarify my intention. I did
not mean to argue that all the Court's fundamental rights decisions have
yielded results that "would have been produced by the political
this vision is naive, but I have known too many judges who strive for this ideal to
assume cynically that none succeed.
34 Bork, supra note 28, at 390.
31 See Carter, supra note 5, at 865-72.
36 In a forthcoming article, taking my own advice, I try to determine whether the
constitutional structure facilitates dialogue among the Justices and their various
constituencies in the wake of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Carter, The
Morgan 'Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1986).
19861
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process"aT-I find it hard to conceive of so absurd a notion-and conse-
quently, Professor Chemerinsky's tidy refutation of that empirical proposi-
tion is quite beside my main point. The language to which I assume he is
referring is this:
[A] colorable case can be made that with the possible exception of
Baker v. Carr, which may be a special case, none of the Court's
fundamental rights decisions has worked a societal change so funda-
mental and revolutionary that it could not in fairly short order have been
brought by other means. I am not here suggesting that the decisions are
unimportant but rather resisting the notion that social change has come
about solely because the Supreme Court has decreed it. The Court
might play a vital role in the process of moral evolution, but in the end,
law is not effective unless the nation changes itself.38
Professor Chemerinsky quite properly chides me for my use of the phrase
"in fairly short order," which carries quite the wrong implication and is
contrary to the main thrust of my argument. The phrase is overly flippant
and I cheerfully withdraw it. But it is only a four-word excerpt from a much
longer argument. The key point is not whether political processes (or other
means of altering the consciousness of a society) could have accomplished
the same societal changes so rapidly. I meant to emphasize instead that
absent a change in public belief and behavior, even the most morally cele-
brated judicial decision would over time prove empty. Thus on the next page I
added:
Obviously, in each case American history would have been different-
perhaps briefly-had the decision gone the other way, but it is difficult
to resist the conclusion that the ultimate resolution of each controversy
was or will be the result of public dialogue and political decision. 39
And finally:
Relatively few judicial decisions cannot be circumvented by a
sufficiently clever legislature or an adequately aroused populace; that
more decisions are not overturned simply indicates that public opinion
that a case is wrongly decided does not translate automatically into
public determination to change it-as many politicians have learned to
their frustration. Other decisions may survive because, quite simply, the
public changes its collective mind. When public opinion shifts to accept
a once-controversial judgment, the people, not the courts, are neverthe-
less governing .... By holding up to stark scrutiny societal practices
they consider pernicious, the Justices may propel otherwise indifferent
citizens to the conscious decision whether to continue or abandon the
practices. Thus, whether the controversial decision is obeyed, evaded,
7 Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 49.
38 Carter, supra note 5, at 850 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 851.
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or overturned, the ultimate decision rests with all political actors, not
merely the judicial ones. 40
Now, this might well strike the reader as a claim that political processes
could duplicate the work of courts, and if it does, I must apologize, because I
did try to craft the argument with care. My emphasis was not on any
particular process of change, but rather on the interaction among the courts
and the many other actors necessarily involved in any movement toward
transformation. I knew when I offered it that corventional theorists would
likely be taken aback-perhaps with reason!-by this limited vision of the
role the courts play in governing America, and perhaps I should have laid
more important stress on the tentative nature of my thoughts. But this vision
was only one of two distinct arguments. It was by no means a premise for
what followed; I stated explicitly that it was an option, that one who rejected
this claim could nevertheless seek solace in the next part of what I had to
say-my explication of the political Constitution.41
The justification project that I have set out-and it is only a project, not a
grand theory, or at least not yet-turns less on the reader's appreciation of
my vision of the limited counter-majoritarian significance of the fundamental
rights cases than on the ability of scholars to demonstrate relatively clear
meanings for the structural provisions that make up the political Constitu-
tion. Whether this can be done through the selection of appropriate interpre-
tive rules depends on one's understanding of the nature of the interpretive
enterprise, the problem to which I next turn.
II. THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION
"Interpretation" is the name that we give to the process through which
the significance of a text is explicated. Interpretation takes place in two
"locations": in the mind of the reader and in the context of the world. It
does not take place "within" a text. At best, a text is nothing more than a
symbol providing the opportunity for interpretation. The text is the thing
that is interpreted, but it does not interpret itself.42 I would not deny that a
text, once interpreted, may be said to "have" a meaning. The meaning it
has, however, is the one that the interpretive process yields, and is conse-
quently no more authoritative than the process that produced it.
40 Id. at 851-52.
41 See id. at 853 ("Those who find unplatable the assertion that the fundamental
rights decisions represent only a small component of governance may find this
alternative argument somewhat easier to digest.").
42 In modem literary theory, the proposition that the meaning of a text necessarily
varies with the interpretive context is prominent in the work of Jacques Derrida, the
founder of Deconstructionism. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson
trans. 1981); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivack trans. 1976); see also H.
BLOOM, P. DE MAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN & J. MILLER, DECONSTRUCTION AND
CRITICISM (1979) (essays toward developing a theory of difference).
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A text does not have meaning in the way that a human hand may have
fingers. A meaning is assigned by an interpreter through an interpretive
process. It is ,not assigned in the way that a student is assigned a seat in
elementary school, but more in the way that a theory is assigned to explain
an observed phenomenon. Propounding and testing theories is a creative
process; so is interpretation. 43 The interpretation propounded in the explica-
tion of any given text, moreover, will vary with the purpose for which the act
of interpretation is undertaken. If I see a man brandishing a huge knife as he
dances on a street corner shortly after midnight, the next day's leisurely
classroom inquiry "What was he trying to say?" and the more mundane
contemporaneous puzzle "Is it safe to pass?" are both interpretive ques-
tions, but they serve different ends and have different answers.
Adjudication under the Constitution (or any other legal text) is quintessen-
tially an act of interpretation, too. 44 Like it or not, meaning is created, not
simply found, when a judge interprets the Constitution; the interpreting
judge engages in an act of creation. Creation in turn demands imagination.
Because a judge called upon to decide a case turning on a constitutional
interpretation engages in a creative act, she also engages in an act of
imagination. The text provides the occasion, but the judicial mind-always,
set in its larger context, of the world in general and the judge's socialization
in particular-undertakes the act itself.45
To say that interpretation is creative and imaginative is not, however, to
say that it is unbounded. Human imagination can always be bounded by
rules. When Stephen King, perhaps the best-selling novelist of our time, sits
down to write, he does so with a keen understanding of what will scare
people and what will keep them turning the pages. 46 His creative act is
bounded by the rules of his twin endeavors: satisfying his public and selling
books. More formal rules may also serve to channel the creative imagina-
tion. What I write will not be identical to what I think, because what I write
is bounded by rules of grammar that do not hamper my mental imagery; I
write in order to communicate, and the rules of that project limit my free-
dom. 47 The same is true for rules of interpretation: By their nature, they limit
41 I take it that this starting point-the creative nature of interpretation-is shared
by literary critics who move off in sharply different directions. See generally the
essays collected in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION (W. Mitchell ed. 1983).
44 See Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 43, at 249; Fiss, supra note 32.
45 See Fiss, supra note 32, at 744-45. On this point, of course, the delegitimizing
critics agree enthusiastically. See, e.g., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 765 (1982) (criticizing Fiss).
46 See generally S. KING, STEPHEN KING'S DANSE MACABRE 241-380 (1981)
(setting forth author's theories on when and why horror sells).
47 Thus the law of contracts, for example, may face a hopeless muddle in its effort
to enforce a voluntary undertaking between parties through the highly formalistic
(hierarchical) interpretation of a written document, because the document and the
minds of the parties are logically distinct. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruc-
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the freedom of the observer to find meaning in a text. The observer may
quarrel with or applaud the motivation of the propounder of any particular
set of interpretive rules. But whether those rules call for enforcing an
understanding drawn from historical materials,4 8 the advancement of
socialism, 4 9 or the maximization of wealth 5 0 they serve equally well to
constrain the creative freedom of the interpreter. I do not propose that these
rules are moral equivalents, but I do believe that each is capable of relatively
neutral application.
The fact that any rule can constrain creative freedom is sometimes missed
by those who assert that constitutional theories fall into two categories,
"interpretive" and "non-interpretive." The error is the assumption that one
school assigns to the Constitution a different importance than the other. This
simply isn't so. When Aloysius cries "intent of the Framers" and Ber-
nadette ripostes "emergent moral consensus" their disagreement is not over
the weight to be assigned to the Constitution, but rather over the rules that
will bind the interpreter in the creative act of transforming its symbols into
policy. 5' Paul Brest and Laurence Tribe do not respect the Constitution any
less than do Robert Bork and Raoul Berger; their argument is over what
demands that respect places on the interpreter. Each theorist's view on the
best means for channeling the creative imagination of the reader is put forth
as a set of interpretive rules. 2
tion of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1039-66 (1985). Although critical legal
scholars sometimes present this proposition as though it represents a startling and
fresh insight, not all mainstream scholars have been duped into reification. Cf. B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 100 (1921) ("We no longer
interpret contracts with meticulous adherence to the letter when in conflict with the
spirit.").
48 See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-96 (1977).
49 See Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411,
424-26 (1981).
50 See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
"' See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 471-76.
52 Those who advocate the so-called "plain meaning" rule and the various forms
of originalism sometimes assert that only they are truly "interpreting" the texts,
because only they are trying to find out what the writers "really meant." See, e.g.,
Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981);
Meese, The Battle for the Constitution, POL'Y REV., Winter 1986, at 35. But an
argument of this nature assumes its conclusion: Someone else could just as easily say
that only she is truly "interpreting" the texts, because only she is trying to find out how
to use the text to advance the cause of world socialism. A separate case must be made
to explain why one set of interpretive rules is superior to another. In the absence of a
community sharing a consensus on the correct interpretive rules to be applied to the
text, this may often be impossible. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
(1980). Owen Fiss has suggested that the legal community may be of this nature, see
Fiss, supra note 32, at 746-50, but I have my doubts, see Carter, supra note 5, at 835-37.
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The crucial question for many constitutional theorists is whether the rules
governing interpretation can be set out with clarity sufficient to render
constitutional adjudication something other than the judge's imposition of
her own value preferences. Those I call "delegitimizers" are of the view that
mainstream liberalism cannot resolve this question: liberals, if they seek
rules to cabin judicial freedom, are stuck with a Bickelean exaltation of
process and a process that occasionally produces repugnant results. The
only answer liberals can come up with, so the argument goes, is the funda-
mental rights form of judicial review, that is, to ignore the process-and any
coherent rules for interpretation that the process might require-and impose
better results. But this of course is what classical liberalism forbids, for there
must, in liberal theory, be a way of recognizing law and distinguishing it from
simple power.5 3 Judges in the liberal state are to enforce this recognizable
law. If they do something else-for example, enforcing their preferences and
calling them law-they are violating the rules that make liberal constitutional
adjudication possible. Thus the essence of the critique is not that the funda-
mental rights jurisprudence reaches substantive results that are good or
bad-such notions are quite irrelevant 54-but rather, that liberal political
theory cannot explain it.s5 And if even liberals admit that they must some-
times step outside their own system in order to avoid morally repugnant
results, then their system must on its own terms be immoral. 56
All of this should be quite familiar to those who follow the contemporary
debate on constitutional meaning, but it bears repeating because my original
essay apparently left these matters unclear. I see the same theoretical
muddle as everyone else, but I am less disturbed by it. I have not tried to
prove that the muddle is clear or even good; I certainly have not sought to
explain, justify, or refute the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on matters of
individual right. I have tried only to recommend paths that those seeking to
resolve the legitimacy question might follow. The most important of those
paths concerns the proper interpretive rules to be used in bounding interpre-
53 This is why positivists insist on what H.L.A. Hart first called "rules of recogni-
tion" to distinguish law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW passim (1961).
Without such rules-and maybe even with them-what we call law looks a good deal
like a simple (and perhaps violent) power grab. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
54 There is a separate delegitimatizing argument emphasizing the results reached
and arguing that they reinforce an entrenched order that is inherently repressive. For
a sampling of this work, see the essays collected in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys
ed. 1982).
55 See, e.g., Horowitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of
Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979); Tushnet, supra note 49.
56 Of course the argument is richer than my inadequate textual summary. Those
wishing to understand it in all its subtlety should look to the original sources. See
Carter, supra note 5, at 822 n.4, 824 n.8, 825 nn.9-10 (citing articles taking this critical
stance).
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tation under the political Constitution. My reluctance to insist on the same
rules for interpreting the fundamental rights clauses reflects no disbelief in
the possibility of concrete interpretation; it reflects instead my understand-
ing that interpretation under different provisions of the Constitution may be
undertaken for different reasons and thus may well be bounded by different
sets of rules. But even if I am wrong-even if the paths I suggest are poorly
chosen-they at least should be criticized for where they claim to lead, not
for where they might have gone instead.
Yet I fear that the interpretive notion I had in mind when I decided to use
the word "originalism" has been freighted with all the interpretive baggage
the term has come to carry in constitutional debate. For example, after
concluding that I have advocated originalism, Professor Chemerinsky an-
nounces that originalism "refers to a method of deciding cases based solely
on the stated or intended meaning of constitutional provisions."7 He cites
Paul Brest for this proposition.5 8 His critique of originalism as Professor
Brest first defined it is powerful, but it is also unenlightening, since I do not
use the word in the same way. I am not sure how one would define or
identify an "intended meaning," and I do not know why such a creature
ought to guide interpretation. But on somber reflection, I realize that the
language I used in describing the beast I have in mind is sufficiently ambigu-
ous that Professor Chemerinsky's reading may be a natural one. Conse-
quently, I should explain briefly what I hoped to convey.
The originalism that I advocate concerns only the Framers' plan for the
day-to-day operation of the government, and within this limitation it is aimed
primarily at the system of checks and balances. I don't care a whit whether
the Framers expected all the Presidents to be men5 9 or hoped that slaves
would never beget voters. 60 I care instead about the Framers' shared under-
standing on the ways in which the government institutions they established
would interact. When I make reference to the original understanding, I mean
precisely that: An understanding, a generally shared view-if one can be
found-on these day-to day operations. Thus I have argued elsewhere that
57 Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 50.
58 Id. n. 17 (citing Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204 (1980)). As Professor Brest recognizes, the varieties of
originalism are not easily captured in a single, neat definition. See Brest, supra, at
205-18, 222-24.
19 Professor Chemerinsky uses this example to show that even as applied to
structural clauses, strict originalism of the form that he describes may produce
morally repugnant results. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 56. I wholeheartedly
agree.
60 For different perspectives on the views of the framers toward slavery, compare
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232-46
(1967) (revolutionary rhetoric planted seeds of slavery's destruction) with A. HIG-
GINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS
371-89 (1978) (maybe, but the Framers themselves didn't care).
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Nixon v. Fitzgerald6 1 was right to hold the President immune from civil
damages liability for his official misconduct, not because damages would be
good or bad policy, and certainly not because some scrap of constitutional
history showed that some group of individuals at the time of ratification
thought that this liability would be a horrible thing, but rather because a
study of the history convinced me that those who wrote and ratified the
Constitution spent considerable time and effort working out the ways in
which presidential power ought to be checked. 62 In the face of this broadly
shared understanding on the weapons available to rein in an errant Chief
Executive, I wrote, no court should lightly imply a cause of action for
damages, because that cause of action would constitute a fresh check and
would thus risk upsetting the balance. 63 The interpretive question was not
whether anyone "intended" civil damages liability, but rather whether those
who wrote and ratified the Constitution had worked out an understanding on
how the President ought to be disciplined, and whether an implied cause of
action for damages fit snugly into the scheme that the Framers worked out.
In a similar vein, I have recently been critical of a proposal by the
Federation of American Scientists to require the President to obtain the
permission of a congressional committee before he can make a "first use" of
nuclear weapons. 64 Although I quite agree with those who assert that the
war power is qualitatively different from other congressional prerogatives,
my consideration of the history has convinced me that the general under-
standing at the time the Constitution was ratified held that the Congress as a
whole-not some committee-was the appropriate body to check the Presi-
dent's use of the armed forces. 65 A court interpreting the warmaking provi-
sions in light of this history might well sustain a requirement that the
President receive the permission of the entire Congress before expending a
nuclear weapon. 6 6 But only by setting aside this history-by choosing an
interpretive rule permitting greater creative freedom-could a court permit
some subset of the Congress to perform the same task.
61 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
62 See Carter, supra note 13.
63 Id. at 1364-67, 1373-84.
64 See Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlauful, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1984, at 94.
A "first use"-the expenditure of any nuclear weapon for a hostile purpose-is not
necessarily the same as a "first strike," which is a preemptive strategic attack.
65 See Carter, Warmaking Under the Constitution and the First Use of Nuclear
Weapons (unpublished manuscript, forthcoming in published proceedings of No-
vember 1985 Airlie House conference on -Stone, supra note 64); see also Carter, The
Constitution and the Prevention of Nuclear Holocaust, J. LEGIS. (forthcoming
1986).
66 The decision in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), does not necessarily affect this conclusion. See Carter, The Constitutionality
oaithe War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984) (supporting constitutional-
ity of congressional vetoes of use of armed forces).
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These are both examples of what I mean when I say that judicial decision
on the interpretation of structural clauses should be guided by the original
understanding on the separation of powers and other aspects of the political
Constitution. Creativity and judgment still have vital roles to play: It is the
judge who must try to uncover and then to apply this contemporaneous
expectation. But the creativity will be bounded by rules-rules that are
selected in accordance with the purpose for which the interpretation is
undertaken. From what I have said, it should be plain why I hold that the
discretion of judges assigning meaning to the document's structural clauses
must be quite narrow; in keeping with this purpose, a judge choosing in-
terpretive rules under the political Constitution should select those that will
most effectively restrict that discretion. 67 It happens that rules calling for a
search of the history will have this effect, but I hardly would claim that no
other rules would do S0. 6 8 When I say that I recommend a scholarly project,
that is exactly what I mean; if other scholars have better ideas, I look
forward to their presentation.
III. THE WEAKNESS OF INTERPRETATION
Having restated (and, I hope, somewhat improved) my argument, I hasten
to add that I am not altogether satisfied with it. Despite what I have said, I
am not fully convinced that interpretative rules can by themselves serve to
legitimate the peculiar process through which the American political system
tests its laws and policies. But then, I am not sure that the interpretive rules
are the most important place to look. It is the process, not any individual
decision, that must be justified if the issue is the legitimacy of judicial
review. If one dislikes a particular decision-Roe v. Wade, say, to take but
the most frequently mentioned recent example among the Court's many
controversial pronouncements-the argument ordinarily (and properly)
pressed is that the case was wrongly decided. That is an argument quite
distinct from the claim that the decision is beyond the power of the Court.
To equate the two, as I believe some critics of Roe v. Wade have tended to
do, 6 9 is to recast the argument over legitimacy in a logically improper form:
Judicial review is legitimate only when the correct results are reached.
67 1 do not of course contend that judicial discretion in choosing rules to govern
interpretation of constitutional clauses protecting individual rights should not also be
restricted. I simply am less certain what the restrictions in individual rights cases
ought to be.
69 Indeed, even using the history will not always have the desired effect of
narrowing discretion. Cf. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love AfJaiir, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 119, 157 (accusing the Warren Court of rewriting history "to serve the
interests of libertarian idealism").
69 See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (suggesting that Roe is wrong in a way that is qualitatively
different from the way in which other decisions are wrong).
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The reason that this claim is logically improper should be clear. When a
judicial decision is said to be incorrect, the reason may be that the application
of the interpretive rules was poorly done or that the rules are themselves
wrong. But in either instance, to call the exercise of judicial power illegiti-
mate represents quite a peculiar understanding of what that power is and
how it works. 70 One aspect of the liberal state (in theory at least) is that for
all its emphasis on individual autonomy, it permits the correction of errors
without the need for resort to revolution. If this is so, then liberalism
presumes that errors will occur, and that in the fullness of time they will be
overcome. Judicial errors may be more difficult to overcome than errors of
the more politically receptive branches, but no government error is over-
come without effort.
Judicial errors are not undemocratic simply because they are more
difficult to correct. It is after all the structure of the Constitution, not some
abstract theory, that determines the degree and kind of democracy to be
embodied in American practice. 71 Thus there is little point to an inquiry that
asks simply whether the difficulty involved in overturning judicial decisions
711"[A] judge could misunderstand or misapply a rule and still be constrained by it
.... Not every mistake in adjudication is an example of lawlessness." Fiss, supra
note 32, at 748. It may be, as Professor Fiss suggests, that there are some selections
or applications of interpretive rules so outrageous that one could not possibly call
them legitimate but mistaken, and would have to call them illegitimate and abusive
instead. A judge who is self-conscious about her role, however, would be unlikely to
commit such an error. To pursue the example in the text, a legitimately self-con-
scious judge of good will could have come down on either side in Roe v. Wade.
7 As Robert Bork and others have pointed out, failure to come to grips with this
point is the central flaw in John Ely's otherwise quite challenging monograph on
judicial review. See Bork, supra note 28, at 390 (commenting on J. ELY, supra
note 1); see also Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Con-
tradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (deny-
ing textual basis for Dean Ely's argument); Tushnet, supra note I (same). An
analogous failure, however, undermines the work of the many theorists who, like
Judge Bork himself, assume too quickly that the institution of judicial review is not
itself an important part of the scheme of majoritarian democracy that the Constitution
is said to create. See Bork, supra note 28, at 383-84; see also Berger, supra note 52;
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
One may fairly ask, moreover, what political theory it is that tells us why this
two-hundred-year-old document is the place we should look to learn how much
democracy America ought to have. Bruce Ackerman has argued persuasively that if
the initial ratification of the Constitution (not in accord with the forms of the Articles
of Confederation) is binding and makes the document authoritative because "We, the
People" adopted it, then any recreation of the level of political dialogue in which
"We, the People" acted should be equally binding now. See Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). This, too, is a
dialogic theory, and a powerful one, although the difficu)ty in establishing rules of
recognition to determine when the proper level of political dialog has been achieved
(Vol. 66: 71
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is a substantial one. What matters much more is whether that difficulty is
something contemplated by the constitutional structure. Put this way, mat-
ters become almost too easy: Isolating the courts from political pressure is
important in fulfilling the constitutional plan. 72
That plan makes no mention, of course, of a dialogue between the Su-
preme Court and its constituents. But the dialogic conception, as I men-
tioned, is largely descriptive rather than normative: Judicial decisions may
be changed over time, and incorrect or oppressive rulings need not stand for
eternity. Governmental mistake, moreover, is quite a different animal than
governmental abuse. Thus the assertion that wrong exercises of judicial
power betray the illegitimacy of granting the power at all is simply false. The
better claim is that the work of the Court is illegitimate not if in particular
cases it fulfills its task poorly, but only if its general task cannot be justified.
The scheme that I have outlined, focusing on the system of checks and
balances and on the rules for adjudication under it, is intended to justify that
general task-not particulaP results.
Still, there are shuddering contradictions in my argument, and I am not
proud of them. For one thing, it may seem at least peculiar that after so
sharply criticizing the late Alexander Bickel's vision of a dialogic process, I
would nevertheless come up with something quite similar as a part of my
proposed justification project. But I would distinguish the classical form of
the argument, which, as propounded by Professor Bickel, relies on some
lurking threat of disobedience as the key to the dialogue, 73 from what might
be termed a neo-Bickelean form, which recognizes the mature constitutional
culture that offers the courts a substantial degree of protection from de-
fiance, while insisting that a dialogue is nevertheless joined. In this neo-
Bickelean view, the Justices retreat not because they fear a lurking waste of
scarce constitutional capital, but rather because they are convinced by the
arguments against their position-surely a happier proposition for liberal
theory. Even within this model, however, the force of public derision, as
exemplified by the society's refusal to transform itself into the model the
may be insuperable. Like other dialogic theories-including the one propounded in
my Indeterminate Test essay and further delineated here-Professor Ackerman's
offers no solace for those troubled by Derrick Bell's provocative challenge to
mainstream theorists to show why those the Constitution was designed to oppress
should now be bound by it. See Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword:
The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
71 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The
Complete independence of the courts of justice is particularly essential in a limited
Constitution.").
73 Although the two books are from different phases of Professor Bickel's career
and are consequently quite different in their emphases, the lurking theme of public
withdrawal of consent to the judicial role is common to both A. BICKEL, supra note 1,
which lectures the Court's critics for missing this point, and A. BICKEL, THE MORAL-
ITY OF CONSENT (1975), which lectures the Justices for precisely the same mistake.
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judges have in mind, is one of the arguments that might cause the courts to
reconsider the challenged decision model.
Another problem with dialogic arguments, however, is not so easily dis-
posed of. The fear that some critics have is not that these arguments prove
too much but that they prove too little. Dialogic conceptions of judicial
review and democratic theory have in common with other conceptions a
tendency toward weakness at the margins. If judicial review really proceeds
in this manner-so the standard question runs-then what could a court do
to stop the Holocaust? John Ely has answered by suggesting-wrongly, I
think-that constitutional theory ought not to be tailored to marginal
cases. 74 Another form of response is to dismiss the question, concluding
that were the flooding violence of a fresh Holocaust to break suddenly upon
us, no mere judicial decision could turn the tide, and consequently, a theory
that addresses the problem is by definition irrelevant.
But this response is not obviously correct. True, as I noted in my original
essay, no judicial review is useful "if the people ... are either brainwashed
or essentially mean-spirited and unembarassed about it.""71 True-but not
sufficient as an answer. If the dialogic conception of judicial review is an
accurate picture of the world, then a judge free to indulge the creative
imagination has a better chance of preventing the greatest evils than does
one bound to follow relatively arcane sources of law. The reason flows from
the common vision of the educational role of the courts, a vision reinforced
by a conception of judicial review as dialogue. In this role, the courts hold
pernicious practices up to the light and force the public to acknowledge what
it is doing. Yes, the people might continue and do whatever it is that their
judges disapprove. But faced with a judicial statement that their campaign is
unconstitutional-faced, say, with an official recognition of the murderous
reality of a Holocaust-the one thing that people could not do is turn their
backs and pretend that nothing was happening. Might a Holocaust come
again anyway? To the sad discredit of the world, the only fair answer is that
for all our prayers that it will not, it always might. But faced with a judicial
decision ordering a halt, those perpetrating it and those trying to ignore it
would have a much harder time telling themselves that only someone else's
lives-not their own souls-were at risk.
This is an answer, but perhaps a weak one; dialogic models, no matter the
labels under which they are filed, will always leave matters in a muddle. The
point of my original essay was that muddling can be comfortable if the
people are prudent and essentially of good will. 76 If, through the generation
74 J. ELY, supra note 1, at 183; see also Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
399 (1985) (contending that constitutional theorists spend too much time on the tough
ones).
71 Carter, supra note 5, at 870.
71 Thus I wrote:
These day-to-day operations might easily be ridiculed as no more than a muddle,
and there is a degree of truth to that description. But the degree of truth is a
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of more determinate interpretations of the structural clauses, the judicial
muddle can be limited to questions involving fundamental rights, the
muddling can be more comfortable. If judicial review takes its proper place
as part of a clear, dynamic, and functioning system of checks and balances,
it is more comfortable still. There remains the task of learning whether the
system of balanced and separated powers operates and can be understood
through the proper application of a clear set of interpretive rules, and it is to
that task that those who care about legitimacy should turn their efforts.
That, at least, is my own conclusion. If instead mainstream theorists stick
with the effort to craft grand theories; if they prefer to fight over the best
resolutions for claims of fundamental right; if they choose, calipers in hand,
to measure the efficacy of specific checks on "counter-majoritarian" judicial
review; if constitutional theorists do all of these things, I wish them luck. But
I also wish they would stop saying that the rest of us are asking the wrong
questions. For in the nature of scholarly enterprise, most questions have
answers, whether or not the answers have yet been found. And any question
that has an answer is a right one.
comfortable one; to say that the government muddles is not at all the same as
saying that the government is lawless. Muddles, as Arthur Leff pointed out,
come in more than one shape.
Id. at 857 (footnote omitted).
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